3

φαν2

then, must reveal whatever common nature is necessarily shared by the
significations of all thoughts. You ‘catch on,’ I hope. I mean, you apprehend in
what way the system of Existential Graphs is to furnish a test of the
truth or falsity of Pragmaticism. Namely, a sufficient study of the Graphs should show
what nature is truly common to all significations of concepts; whereupon a comparison
will show whether that nature be or be not the very ilk that Pragmaticism
(by the definition of it) avers that it is. It is true that the two terms of this
comparison, while in substance identical, yet might make their appearance under such
different garbs that the student might fail to recognize their identity. At
any rate, the possibility of such a result has to be taken into account; and therewith
it must be acknowledged that, on its negative side, the argument may not turn
out to be sufficient. For example, quâ Graph, a concept might be regarded as the passive
object of a geometrical intuitus, although Pragmaticism certainly makes the essence of every
concept to be exhibited in an influence on possible conduct; and a student might fail to perceive
that these two aspects of the concept are quite compatible.