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24. ever, he had an important task set him. The Nawab Wazir, like so many of the Indian rulers of the time, was quite powerless to manage his kingdom. His troops were disorderly & disaffected, a danger rather than a defence: his civil administration was as rotten & useless as his army. Oudh had long been under the Company's protection. A former treaty with Sir John Shore had given the Wazir 13,000 British troops in return for his annual payment of about [pound symbol]750,000; & he was moreover given a guarantee that these troops should effectually protect him against his enemies. This treaty had served its purpose at the time, & 13,000 troops would have been sufficient under any ordinary circumstances. But a new factor had intruded itself into the position. Oudh, the most vulnerable point in all the British dominions in India, was threatened by no common foe. The danger may have been exaggerated; it may have been real. In any case it is certain that anxious fears were being entertained concerning the possibility of an invasion from Zeman Shah, a most powerful Afghan
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25. chief. If he chose to invade Oudh in its then state with a well organized army from the hills, the 13,000 British troops would be quite inadequate to defend so large a country against so powerful a foe, & Oudh would be overrrun & the borders of Bengal laid open to his attack. The Marathas too, & even the Sikhs, did not seem indisposed to venture an attack on so tempting a prey. The Governor-General was not slow in determining what course was the best to take. As early as December 23rd, 1798 his mind was made up. But he was still busy with important issues in the South, & could not as yet carry determination into action. No sooner, however, were the anxieties of the Mysorean war over, than he turned his attention to the Northern danger. His two chief objects were; first, to gain complete control of the Doab, the strip of land between the Jumma & the Ganges, so as to be able to check any invasion into Oudh; & secondly, to procure the disbandment of the Nawab's useless but expensive army. He argued that the money that was wasted on these futile & rebellious
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26. troops might well be spent in maintaining a large addition to the British force in Oudh, which would ensure the safety of the state. This was well enough from the British standpoint; but it was obviously unpalatable to the Nawab Wazir that his kingdom should be put into such entire dependency on the Company. On November 5th, 1799 Wellesley wrote to him suggesting that such an expedient should be adopted to increase the army to a sufficient force. Colonel Scott had been sent to Lucknow as Resident. The Nawab Wazir consulted with him but could come to no decision. Eventually he asserted that he had made up his mind to abdicate. As it turned out, this was merely a diplomatic move, & in reality no such intention ever entered his head. But Wellesley, on hearing of the Wazir's declaration, expressed himself against any such step. If, however, the Wazir were determined upon it, he pointed out that the new ruler would be in a very difficult position; that the system of divided control would be, if possible, yet more hopeless than before; & that in his opinion the wisest & most fitting