Journal of events & minutes of particular evidence relating to the late expedition against Rochefort &c & the subsequent Courts of Enquiry

Sept. 28th Gen'l Conway the same - but merely from his own opinion without regard to the evidence!

Sir. E. Hawke appeal'd to the members of the Council for the truth? of what he said - that his opinion had always been & was unchang'd - that the landing could be effected &? that the troops ought to be landed for some further attempt - which was alone matter of consideration w'h the general officers of the troops? he not taking upon himself to be a judge of land operations - but w'd from his confidence in their ability & skill in their own profession readily assent to any resolution they might come to & assist them to the utmost of his power -

After some further talk there withdrew Sir J. Mordaunt, Adm'ls Knowles, & Brodrick & Capt. Rodney

Sept 28th & the Council of War being reassembled the question was put

Whether it is advisable to land the troops & attack the Forts leading to & upon the mouth of the River Charente?

Yes. Col. Howard Capt. Rodney Adm'l Brodrick Gen'l Conway Adm'l Knowles Sir J. Mordaunt Sir E. Hawke

No. Maj-Gen'l Cornwallis (afterwards withdrew his negative to make it unanimous)

It was accodingly resolv'd to land this same night - Orders were forthwith issued & by 1 o'clock the Grenadiers & other troops taking part in the first embarkation were in the boats. At this critickal juncture a strong wind sprang up from the shoar - This alarm'd the officers of the fleet who were to conduct the landing. They respresented that the long boats which they were about to tow cou'd only make w'h difficulty & that in consequence the troops w'd be unduly exposed to the fire of the enemy - also that the transport

transport boats, which were row'd by soldiers w'd be still slower & more exposed; that it w'd be daylight before? the first party c'd get ashore & 6 hours before these cou'd be supported? by a second embarkation.

In response to all this reasoning the generals agreed that the propos'd landing was inexpedient that night. The naval officers thought it equally? so to do so by day, wherefor unclear? the following morning

Sept 29th The Admiral acquainted the Gen'l officers that if they had no further military operations to propose sufficient? to authorize his detaining the squadron under his command, he intended to sail for England with loss of time.

This blow was foreeen & was the natural result of all our procrastination - yet was much conformable to the secret wishes of many. Deep mortification of others - especially Clarke.

Sir J. Mordaunt summon'd those land officers who had been members of the

29th Councils of War to meet at noon - Nevertheless before they were all apprised Sir John order'd Col. Howard, Lt. Col Murray & myself to reconnoitre the Bay of Chatelaillon On the Viper" We therefore set out & examin'd it carefully as well as well as we were able & cou'd not perceive any batteries, redoubts, entrenchments or troops to obstruct our landing in the great Bay - On the land side, however, the hills were high enough to hide the motions of the enemy. We were inform'd by the Caption of the Viper Sloop (which had been very active in carrying despatches) that while anchor'd near shore he had seen a number of men working in the land hills the past few days - He saw 6 pieces of cannon upon the Pointe of Chatelaillon & several guards & posts along the shore of the smaller bay to the South - but our boats have been well out of reach of the enemy cannon -

At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon we return'd & reported to Sir John Mordaunt who inform'd us that the Generals were

Sept 29th then about to meet to consider what was to be done - in view of the Admiral's letter - The generals accordingly met that evening & decided? to abandon the whole enterprise & return forthwith to England. Sir E. Hawke declared that the landing? was "a matter of judgement which concern'd merely the sea officers & the sea had nothing to do w'h it."

Oct .4th The fleet got into the Channel

6th Came to anchor at St. Helen's the transports reaching Spithead in the evening.

7th Disembark'd at Portsmouth to await instructions regarding the troops.

8th Five batt'ns (including Kingley's) to proceed to Southampton to disembark.

13th Returned to London & from there the next morning to Blackheath.

On November 3rd receiv'd a summons? to attend the Board of Gen'l Officers "to enquire into the causes of the late failure."