ENPages
Page 2
Nijmegen archives. File 7.
Reports and correspondence with Maj. Gen. Gavin regarding Nijmegen's Liberation.
Page 3
Kelly
Notes on meeting with General J. M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967, 12:15 to 1:15 p.m.
Met Gavin at offices of Arthur D. Little Inc., for a brief luncheon get-together. A terribly frank man, open and hospitable. Early part of discussion centered upon Gavin’s relationship with Col. Roy Lindquist, commander of the 508th PIR during the Nijmegen jump. Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily (check this) and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight.
He did not have a "killer instinct." In Gavin’s words, "He wouldn't go for the [crossed out] juggler [end crossed out] [inserted] jugular [end inserted]." As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, "Made great palace guards after the war."
Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the twon but to approach it along some mud flats to the east.
When Gavin learned that Lindquist’s troops were pinned down within a few hundred yards of the bridge on the night of the 17th, he asked him if he had sent them into town by way of the flats. Lindquist said he had not; that a member of the Dutch underground had come along and offered to lead the men in through the city and that he "thought this would be all right."
It's interesting to note that Gavin was without an assistant division commander throughout the war. Ridgway refused to promote Lindquist to brigadier and, since Lindquist was senior colonel in
Page 4
Gavin - 2
the division, was reluctant to jump Tucker, Billingslea or Eckman over him.
The conversation drifted around to the Dutch themselves and in particular to a statement by Lt. Todd, a member of the OSS who had jumped with the British at Arnhem (See our files on Lt. Todd.). Todd, in a report, mentioned that after his capture at Arnhem, he was interrogated by a German major who mentioned infiltrating 82nd Airborne Headquarters, where he was questioned by a man named "Bestebreurtje."
I mentioned to Gavin that Bestebreurtje denied this could have happened; that, in effect, no German could fool him into believing he was a Dutchman. Gavin smiled and remarked that the story had "a real ring of truth about it" and that the chances were Bestebreurtje would not admit to being fooled in any event.
He went on to tell me about the swarms of Dutch peasants who bicycled openly around the countryside for days. "We smiled and waved as they went by," he recalled, "until Lindquist's 508th began taking a helluva pasting from Kraut artillery. Then it dawned on us there were probably dozens of Krauts wearing Dutch clothing riding around on bikes and giving away our positions."
Gavin also told me a story about a German warehouse near 'sHertgenbosch. It seems one of the regiments came across this warehouse and found it full of frozen meat; they helped themselves but when they returned the next day they found the Germans there taking out supplies of meat. In effect then both the Germans and Americans had been eating out of the same warehouse and neither were aware the others were there.
We discussed also objectives. Gavin’s main objectives were the heights at Groesbeek and the Grave bridge; he expected and intelligence
Page 5
Gavin - 3
confirmed "a helluva reaction from the Reichswald area." Therefore he had to control the Groesbeek heights. The Grave bridge was essential to the link up with the British 2nd Army. He had three days to capture the Nijmegen bridge and, although he was concerned about it, he felt certain he could get it within three days.
The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by a coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized.
Instead and in effect, Gavin decided to operated out of what he described as "a power center"; broadly, a strong, centralized circle of power from which he could move in strength upon his objectives. That power center was located, for the most part, in the Groesbeek heights area.
Gavin hesitated to speculate what might have happened if he had put troops down on the northern end of the bridge. He did not, however, think a company could have held it and he openly wondered if even a battalion might have.
He knew, however, that he could not take the bridge by launching an attack on one end only. He therefore determined to send Vandervoort in to clear out the southern approaches to the bridge while, at the same time, launching an attack across the [crossed out] Wal [end crossed out] Waal River to the northern approaches with the 504th PIR.
As soon as advanced elements of the Guards Armored linked up with the division on Tuesday morning, Gavin sent Vandervoorts 2nd Bn., 505, which had been held in reserve, in toward the city. In Vandervoort, Gavin had "boundless confidence." He felt the same way about Rueben