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[page] 108 MISSOURI v. JENKINS
O'CONNOR, J., concurring

acknowledged by the dissent, post, at 173-174. n. 8, of finding
the necessary facts and exercising its discretion accordinly.
Indeed, in footnote 11 itself, we repeated the requirement of
a "significan segregative effect in another district," Milliken
I, 418 U.S., at 745, and held that the Court of Appeals;
"unsupported speculation falls far short of the demonstration"
required, Gautreaux, supra, at 295, n. 11. There would have
been little need to overrule the Court of Appeals expressly
on these factual matters if they were indeed irrelevant.
It is this reading of Hills v. Gautreaux--as an affirmation
of, not a deviation from, Milliken I--that the Court of Appeals
itself adopted in an earlier phase of this litigation:
Milliken and Hills make clear that we may grant interdistrict
relief only to remedy a constitutional violation by the
SSD [suburban school district], or to remedy an interdistrict
effect in the SSD caused by a constitutional violation in
KCMSD." KCMSD." Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F. 2d 657, 672 (CA8
1986) )en banc). Perhaps Gautreaux was "mentioned only
briefly" by the respondents, post, at 174, because the case
may actually lend support to the State's argument.
Absent Gautreaux, the dissent hangs on the semantic
distinction that "the District Court did not mean by an 'intradistrict
violation' what the Court apparently means by it
today. The District Court mant that the violation within
the KCMSD had not led to segregation outside of it, and that
no other school districts had played a part in the violation.
It did not mean that the violation had not produced effects of any
sort beyond the district," but rather whether such violation
caused "significatn segregative effects" across district
boundaries, Milliken I, supra, at 745. When the Court
of Appeals affirmed the District Court's initial remedial
order, it specifically stated that the District Court "dealt not
only with the issue of whether the SSCs [suburban school