48

Cite as: 515 U.S. 70 (1995) [page] 107

O'CONNOR, J., concurring

emphasizes the alleged deviation from Milliken I. But the
Court was free to reject HUD's characterization of the
relevant district, which it did:
"The housing market area 'usually extends beyond the
city limits' and in the larger markets 'may extend into
several adjoining counties.' . . . An order against HUD
and CHA regulating their conduct in the greater metropolitan
area will do no more than take into account
HUD's expert determination of the area relevant to the
respondents' housing opportunties and will thus be
wholly commensurate withe 'the nature and extent of the
constitutional violation.' " 425 U.S., at 299-300 (quoting
Milliken I, supra, at 744).
In light of this explicit holding, any suggestion that
Gautreaux dispensed with the predicates of Milliken I for
interdistrict relief rings hollow.
This distinction notwithstanding, the dissent emphasizes a
footnote in Gautreaux, in which we reversed the finding by
the Court of Appeals that "either an interdistrict violation
or an interdistrict segregative effect may have been
present," 425 U.S., at 294, n.11, and argues that impicit in that
holding is a suggestion that district lines may be ignored
even absent a showing of interdistrict segregative effects,
post, at 173. But not footnote is an island, entire of itself,
and our statement in footnote 11 must be read in context.
As explained above, we rejected the petitioner's categorical
suggestion that "court-ordered metropolitan area relief in
this case would be impermissible as a matter of law," 425
U.S., at 305. But the Court of Appeals had gone too far the
other way, suggesting that the District Court had to consider
metropolitan area relief because the conditions of Milliken
I--i.e., interdistrict violation or significatn interdistrict
segregative effects--had been established as a factual matter.
We reversed these ill-advised findings by the appellate court
in order to preserve to the District Court its proper role,