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3 revisions | Emily Hemlinger at Jun 11, 2024 05:49 PM 45Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka -- Opinion -- 387 U.S. 483 Page 5 of 7
gauge in Pessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [12]
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexty. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question -- the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term.[13] The Attorney General
__________________
Page 496
of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954. [14]
It is so ordered.
FOOTNOTES
PRIOR HISTORY: * Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward December 7-8, 1953; and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953. (Return to opinion)
1. In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary schoola ge residing in Topeka. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute which permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000 population to maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students. Kan. Gen. Stat. § 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka Board of Education elected to establish segregated elementary schools. Other public schools in the community, however, are operated on a nonsegregated basis. The three-judge District Court, convened under 2 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, found that segregation in public education has a detrimental effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground that the Negro and white schools were substantially equal with respect to buildigns, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers. 98 F.Supp. 797. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253.
In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. S. C. Const., Art. XI, § 7; S. C. Code § 5377 (1942). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found that the Negro schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to equalize the facilities. But the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 98 F.Supp. 529. This Court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for the purpose of obtaining the court's views on a report filed by the defendants concerning the progress made in the equalization program, 342 U.S. 350. On remand, the District Court found that substantial equality had been achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were proceeding to rectify this inequality as well. 103 F.Supp. 920. The case is again here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253.
In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age residing in Prince Edward County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which required the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Va. Const., § 140; Va. Code § 22-221
http://brownvboard.org/research/opinions/347us483.htm 11/06/03 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka -- Opinion -- 387 U.S. 483 Page 5 of 7 gauge in Pessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected. We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [12] Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexty. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question -- the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term.[13] The Attorney General of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954. [14] It is so ordered. FOOTNOTES PRIOR HISTORY: * Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward December 7-8, 1953; and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953. (Return to opinion) 1. In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary schoola ge residing in Topeka. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute which permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000 population to maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students. Kan. Gen. Stat. § 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka Board of Education elected to establish segregated elementary schools. Other public schools in the community, however, are operated on a nonsegregated basis. The three-judge District Court, convened under 2 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, found that segregation in public education has a detrimental effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground that the Negro and white schools were substantially equal with respect to buildigns, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers. 98 F.Supp. 797. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. S. C. Const., Art. XI, § 7; S. C. Code § 5377 (1942). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found that the Negro schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to equalize the facilities. But the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 98 F.Supp. 529. This Court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for the purpose of obtaining the court's views on a report filed by the defendants concerning the progress made in the equalization program, 342 U.S. 350. On remand, the District Court found that substantial equality had been achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were proceeding to rectify this inequality as well. 103 F.Supp. 920. The case is again here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age residing in Prince Edward County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which required the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Va. Const., § 140; Va. Code § 22-221 http://brownvboard.org/research/opinions/347us483.htm 11/06/03 45Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka -- Opinion -- 387 U.S. 483 Page 5 of 7
gauge in Pessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions
have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation
also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (12)
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of
local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexty. On reargument,
the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question -- the constitutionality of
segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the
docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the
Court for the reargument this Term. (13) The Attorney General
__________________
Page 496
of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation
in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and
submission of briefs by October 1, 1954. (14)
It is so ordered.
FOOTNOTES
PRIOR HISTORY: * Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward
December 7-8, 1953; and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952,
reargued December 9, 1953. (Return to opinion)
1. In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary schoola ge residing in Topeka. They brought
this action in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute which permits, but does not
require, cities of more than 15,000 population to maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students. Kan. Gen. Stat. [?] 72-1724
(1949). Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka Board of Education elected to establish segregated elementary schools. Other public schools in the
community, however, are operated on a nonsegregated basis. The three-judge District Court, convened under 2 U. S. C. [??] 2281 and 2284,
found that segregation in public education has a detrimental effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground that the Negro and white
schools were substantially equal with respect to buildigns, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers. 98 F.Supp. 797.
The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. [?] 1253.
In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon
County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin enforcement of provisions
in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. S. C. Const., Art. XI, [?] 7; S. C.
Code [?] 5377 (1942). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U. S. C. [??] 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found
that the Negro schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to equalize the facilities. But the court
sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 98
F.Supp. 529. This Court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for the purpose of obtaining the court's views on a report
filed by the defendants concerning the progress made in the equalization program, 342 U.S. 350. On remand, the District Court found that
substantial equality had been achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were proceeding to rectify this inequality as well. 103 F.Supp.
920. The case is again here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. [?] 1253.
In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age residing in Prince Edward County. They
brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state
constitution and statutory code which required the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Va. Const., [?] 140; Va. Code [?] 22-221
http://brownvboard.org/research/opinions/347us483.htm 11/06/03 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka -- Opinion -- 387 U.S. 483 Page 5 of 7 gauge in Pessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected. We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation It is so ordered. FOOTNOTES PRIOR HISTORY: * Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District 1. In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary schoola ge residing in Topeka. They brought In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age residing in Prince Edward County. They http://brownvboard.org/research/opinions/347us483.htm 11/06/03 |
