MS 298-299 Phaneroscopy

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scrutiny, to see find whether or not, it does not detect lead to the detection of a fatal flaw in the definition. You will observe that I say nothing about the different bodily senses. For to make the difference between what is and what is not experience to depend on special senses would, in my opinion, leave experience without any distinctly marked common characters, and without any decisive claim to be acknowledged as the only source of real knowledge. I am therefore [recuced?] to distinguishing it by quantity and as such cannot well be [?] the [?] a chief item in any exact definition, since it is equally impossible to measure a continous quantity exactly and it is equally impossible to find any other than a relative value that there is to find any reason for

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introducing it into the definition unless it be balanced against some other relatively equal quantity. But experience is so decidedly contrasted with all other mental phenomena that it seems to call for exact definition.

If, however, we bear in mind how difficult it often is for a nice observer to distinguish between that which he perceives and that which he imagines, so that the criticism of a single apparent phenomenon may extend last through months, and if, on the other hand, we consider how much reason there is for holding that the force of experience amounts to absolute constraint, from which there is a continuous variation of quantity in one directory only, then I think we must say that the force of experience is the very greatest

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imaginable. If experience the term experience were limited to perception, I should say that it was positive constraint. But it is not so limited. By Under "experience", we include, not merely perception, but the sequence of one perception upon another; and even a generalization of the character of such sequence; this generalization being limited to the direct cognizance of a single person. Thus we know by experience that particularly vivid flashes of light are followed particularly speedily by particularly sharp peals of thunder. whereas Here three senses and many repetitions concur to make one experiential result for each person. We may hesitate for a moment or two to ratify such a statement. It depends upon memory, which is a Judas. Nevertheless, whether I can recall the particular occasions or not (and most likely not in sufficient number to justify the proposition) I

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find myself absolutely constrained [?] over that such is my experience.

The very last clause of my definition is that the dynamical object of the cognition of experience is no other than the immediate object; or, as it is usually expressed, our experience is only of phenomena not of the real things. For example, let a person in whom I have [thus far??] in whose veracity and accuracy I have the highest confidence; -- so much so that I would rather trust to what he says than to my own memory of my own personal experience, -- which may very well be. Then, if that person tells testifies to me something positively as of his own knowledge, though it is conceivable that he should be mistaken, yet I cannot possibly doubt that he had an experience which his words interpret. Nevertheless, im-

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potent as I am to doubt his word, it is not what he tells me that I have experienced, but only the fact that he has told me so.

Having now explained my definition, I will glance at the objections to it. I pass by those which refer to my using the word in a different acceptation from that which some other persons may attach to it; since that is a mere question of words, and of a word which is only half technical. I take notice only of objections to my analysis of the concept.