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feeling is absolutely simple and without parts, as it evidently
is, since it is whatever it is regardless of anything else, and therefore regardless
of any part, which would be something other than the whole, it follow
that if the red color-sensation was not the whole feeling of the instant
it has nothing in common with the feeling of the instant. Indeed, although
a Feeling is immediate consciousness, that is, is whatever of
consciousness there may be that is immediately present, yet there
is no consciousness in it because it is instantaneous. For we have
seen already that Feeling is nothing but a Quality, and Quality
is not conscious; it is a mere possibility. We can, it is true, see what a
Feeling in general is like; that, for example, this of tht red is a Feeling;
and it is perfectly conceivable that a being should have that color for
its entire consciousness, throughout a lapse of time, and therefore of