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jasirs94 at Nov 26, 2016 09:32 PM

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Classification of the Sci
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as exhibiting the very types of instinct have any instinct at all in the sense of the trio's definition. It is contrary to all the analogies of mind. At any rate, it will be far better to class all action as instinctive that is at once conscious, governed by a quasi-purpose, and passing in part definitely beyond all control, since, with reference to natural (and therefore purposive) classification, no characters can be more significant than these three. Should the reader find himself at a loss to understand how knowledge, under this definition, can be instinctive, it may be suspected that he has not sufficiently reflected upon the active nature of thought. It is a capital mistake to suppose that we can be immediately conscious of a thought. True, it may possibly be that we have this power, but there is the most solid reason for preferring the opposite hypothesis. We are immediately conscious only of the present. Now the present is a mere point of time, and it is contrary to analogy to suppose

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