Report of a committee of the Senate of Kentucky, 1824

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of law or equity of a state, in which the case could be heard, had pronounced its final decision between the parties, the judgment or decree might be re-examined and reversed in the federal courts. But it is not necessary to urge the constitutional ogjection. Congress has power to repeal the enactment; [Durousseau us. United States, 6 Cranch 314] it will, therefore, be suddicient for Kentucky to unite with the other states in urging upon that body, the other intrinsci objections and dangerous tendencies of this singular clause. It might be sufficient to say, that by this short paragraph the prerogative of understanding and applying the principles of the federal constitution, is wholly wrested from the states and people, by whom it was made, and consigned to a tribunal installed for life, equally irresponsible to the people and their representatives; that by vesting this jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, seven men, placed above all control by the only rightful sovereigns, are made the final arbiters of the extent of the legislative power of the states, and have it thereby in their power to degrade them to any character " of corporation," which may be dictated by their ambitious designs or capricious fancies. If it be asked, how could uniformity of construction upon those articels of the constitution which are prohibitory to the states, be maintained, if this mode of preserving it be abandoned, it is answered, that this secting does not secure the object. It is only calculated for a reduction of the power of the states by the Supreme Court, where the state judiciaries are not bold enough for the undertaking, whilst it leaves those states without appeal, who are willing to become the victims of such decisions by their own tribunals, as may sink them even below the grade to which the federal judiciary would consign them; so that the enactment only affords a double means of reducing the states, without the advantage of uniformity in either the process or result. It would, therefore, be surely preferable to leave the state judiciaries controllable only by the people and their representatives. This would, at least, avoid the diversity of constitutional law in the same state ; and to remedy the evils of a contrariety of construction which might prevail in the different states, it would surely be safer to resort to explanatory amendments of the constitution, than to leave it wholly in the power of those whom the public will, which is the very soul of the instrument itself, can never reach. This means of obtaining the end, it is belived, would itself have a most advantageous effects. It would produce a continual recurrence to first principles, and awaken a vigilance in the public mind, which would constitute the strongest barries against usurpations from whatever quarter they might come. These means would produce a perfect understanding of the restraints which the states have imposed upon themselves, which is essential to their obligation, and, it is believed, would sufficiently secure theirobservance: Wherefore,

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3. Resolved by the authority aforesaid, That our Senators in Congress be instructed,, and our Representatives requested, to use their best exertions to procure the repeal of so much of any act of Congress as provides that any judgment or decree of the highest court of law or equity in any state, in any case in which is drawn in question, the validity of any statute of a state, on the ground that it is repugnant to the constitution of the United States, may be reversed in the Supreme Coourt of the United States, by writ of error or otherwise. 4. Resolved by the authority aforesaid, That the Governor be requested to transmit a copy of the foregoing Preambles and Resolutions to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress.

ANDREW S. HUGHES, Chairman.

WILLIAM B. O'BANNON,

J. DUDLEY,

WILLIAM WORTHINGTON.

RODES SMITH,

r.BALLINGER.