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of law or equity of a state, in which the case could be heard, had
pronounced its final decision between the parties, the judgment or
decree might be re-examined and reversed in the federal courts.
But it is not necessary to urge the constitutional ogjection. Con-
gress has power to repeal the enactment; [Durousseau us. United
States, 6 Cranch 314] it will, therefore, be suddicient for Kentucky
to unite with the other states in urging upon that body, the other
intrinsci objections and dangerous tendencies of this singular
clause. It might be sufficient to say, that by this short paragraph
the prerogative of understanding and applying the principles of
the federal constitution, is wholly wrested from the states and peo-
ple, by whom it was made, and consigned to a tribunal installed for
life, equally irresponsible to the people and their representatives; that
by vesting this jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, seven men, placed
above all control by the only rightful sovereigns, are made the final
arbiters of the extent of the legislative power of the states, and have
it thereby in their power to degrade them to any character " of
corporation," which may be dictated by their ambitious designs or
capricious fancies.
If it be asked, how could uniformity of construction upon those
articels of the constitution which are prohibitory to the states, be
maintained, if this mode of preserving it be abandoned, it is an-
swered, that this secting does not secure the object. It is only
calculated for a reduction of the power of the states by the Su-
preme Court, where the state judiciaries are not bold enough for
the undertaking, whilst it leaves those states without appeal, who
are willing to become the victims of such decisions by their own
tribunals, as may sink them even below the grade to which the
federal judiciary would consign them; so that the enactment only
affords a double means of reducing the states, without the advan-
tage of uniformity in either the process or result. It would, there-
fore, be surely preferable to leave the state judiciaries controlla-
ble only by the people and their representatives. This would, at
least, avoid the diversity of constitutional law in the same state ;
and to remedy the evils of a contrariety of construction which might
prevail in the different states, it would surely be safer to resort to
explanatory amendments of the constitution, than to leave it whol-
ly in the power of those whom the public will, which is the very
soul of the instrument itself, can never reach. This means of ob-
taining the end, it is belived, would itself have a most advanta-
geous effects. It would produce a continual recurrence to first prin-
ciples, and awaken a vigilance in the public mind, which would
constitute the strongest barries against usurpations from whatever
quarter they might come. These means would produce a perfect
understanding of the restraints which the states have imposed up-
on themselves, which is essential to their obligation, and, it is be-
lieved, would sufficiently secure theirobservance: Wherefore,