21

{Upper left margin: "Logic 21"}

of logicality as often to reason ill, and unless he held the distinction between reasoning well and reasoning ill was that the former w̶a̶s is conducive to the knowledge of the t͟r͟u͟t͟h͟, and the latter not so, and that by the truth is meant something not dependent upon how we feel or think if [d?] be. Upon Sigwart's {Refers to Cristoph von Sigwart (1789-1844)} principle the distinction would be a mere distinction of taste, or the satisfaction of a subjective feeling. This harmonizes only two well with the practice of German university professors, whose r̶e̶a̶s̶o̶n̶i̶n̶g̶ opinions are mainly founded on subjective feeling and upon fashion. In the beginning of the next chapter we shall consider the argument by which Sigwart supports his opinion; and the reader will then be led clearly to understand how, without denying the existence of the ̶s̶e̶n̶s̶e̶ logical sense, ̶a̶n̶d̶ nor its intervention in all thought, I can maintain that it is extremely fallible