2

[10]
the wife in this case taking a separate estate.

On the other hand, Jasper v Howard, 12 Ala 652: Jenkins
v [C??], 26 Ala 213; Ozley v Thelheimer 26 Ma 332: Newman
v James, 12 Ala 29: Petty v Booth, 19 Ale 633; Gessey v Strong, 19 Ala 146;
Brown v Johnson 17 Ala 232: Gould v Hill, 18 Ala 84: Cuthbert v Wolfe,
19 Ala 373: Clark v Windham, 12 Ala 798, 800, tend rather more though
{to} in favor of regarding the wife as taking [here?] a separate estate.

With my imperfect knowledge of these cases, I cannot see how
the estate here can fail to be held a separate estate in [?], without positively overlooking
Jasper v Howard, and Clark v Windham, although I must allow some
of the cases on the other side as scarecely less difficult to reconcile with
the idea of a separate estate.

In the abstract, & upon a general survey of the author Eug.
& American, I think that the two provisions that the trustees are to apply
the annual proceeds of the property to the maintenance of the wife
then family, and to pay the balance yearly to L, for which her
receipt shall be a good discharge, an eenough to determine the char-
acters of the property as L' Separate estate. 2 Brights Hshhip 210 Hy;
Darley v Darley, 3 Athe. 3qo; Lec v Prieaux, 3 Bro. C. C. 382; {Cope v Cope
2 Go. & Coll. 543} Hulme v Tenant, 1 Wh, & T.L.C 376-'7 & consisted:
2 Str. Eq. & 1382.

If it could be supposed that the property was not for L's Separate
use, then I apprehend that the [?], as to the land wd be entitled, not
withstanding the divorce to be tenant by the courtesy , if he [remind?] the wife,
{and meanwhile to enjoy it in her right, that is the profits of it, as}
{annually wd by them the trustees}, and as to the the chattel-property, that
he would be entitled to the wife's life estate therein absolutely. This of
course supposes] that the Court makes no special order touching the property
of these parties. A divorce, even a vinculo, if granted for a cause super-
vising after the marrd, determines the marital relation only
from the time of the sentence, and cannot therefore per se desist there
marital rights which have already visited, such as the husband's