137

Classification of the Sci
30

posing that we are aware of an occurrence and yet never have it present to consciousness. For this is only to suppose that our awareness has the same mode of being as the occurrence itself, which cannot but be the case, considering that the occurrence is an occurrence of our awareness.

Modern psychologists have done comparatively little work upon the intellectual functions and upon those parts of cognition that are not psychophysical. They here continue too largely to accept the vague conceptions of their predecessors. How frequently, for example, is the capital distinction between a percept and an direct perceptual judgment overlooked! How frequently is the old statement repeated that a "sensation," (by which, when the older writers are copied, a percept is generally meant) is "individual," an individual object being defined as one which is determinate in every respect! It needs little reflexion to convince oneself that this is untenable. Is a