132

Classification of the Sci.
29

have a sense that the metamorphosis is forced through overriding my inertia, and takes place, will I, will I. In the former case, it is a simple act of volition, in the latter the experience of a sensation. It may be asked at what instant I first become aware of this. The proper answer is that, in accordance with the reasons already given, we must presume that I never can be aware [of] it in an instant; that this sense is in the first instance an experience which involves a passage from one feeling to another, and that every recollection or imagination of it consists in the repetition of a similar passage. In short, this is a kind of awareness that can be present to us only in a loose sense. For if it were ever strictly present, it could only be a simple feeling, while the sense of exertion is distinctly dual sense, essentially involving effort on the one side and resistance on the other, the sense of exertion not blending these but being alive to their antagonism. There is no difficulty at all in sup-