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PAGE 6.

4. (Continued).

16. LIGHT SIGNALS.
With the exception of ground flares, our light signals were not
used to any extent as it was possible to send messages by Runner to
Battalion Headquarters who were very close up.

17. INDEPENTENT FORCE.
The only time this Force was seen was when two or three Armoured
cars pushed down the CAMBRAI ROAD as far as P.34.d., from whence they
withdrew and two cars at least received direct hits and were destroyed.

5. LESSONS.
Owing to the enemy's present method of defence it is absolutely
essential that either Tanks be utilized for the entire advance or
artillery barrage employed to protect the advancing Infantry. In this
instance the RED LINE was a veritable stronghold of Trench Mortars and
Machine Guns, backed by a heavy garrison fully armed. Further the RED
OBJECTIVE was on the forward slope of a hill and it was necessary for
advancing troops to advance over the crest of hte hill in the open, and
??s firectly under the fire of scores of Machine guns and a great
many Trench Mortars. If our final objective had been the third
DROCOURT LINE in P.27.a? and b. it is considered that our casualties
would have been very light in comparison. The present manner in which
Vickers Machine Guns are controlled, give very little satisfaction to
the Battalion Commander and in this instance although a Battery of guns
was supposed to for, part of the Force of our Battalion, no Officer
reported himself for duty nor were we able to utilize the serices
of this Ars. Tanks were too slow getting into action and their value
was lost. It is considered that if a Battalion Commanderis to use,
with any degree of satisfaction, Trench Mortars, Machine Gunners,
Tanks, or any other Arms of the Service, in conjunction with his own
attack, that he should have more opportunity of getting in touch
with the Officers of these Services, understand their methods, and
the best manner in which they can co-operate with his own troops.

6. 3rd SEPTEMBER.
On the evening of the 3rd September, the Battalion was withdrawn
from the trenches and bivouaced in the trench system in O.20.d. with
Battalion Headquarters in O.30.c.00.90, known as SCH??DTHE?LE.

C.M. Edwards
Lieut. Col.,
Commdg. 38th Canadian Infantry Battalion.

CME/LGD.