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and an object of desire which object is an idea essentially general in its nature.
For it is quite true that it is unthinkable that a person should act deliberately without any satisfaction but this is not all.
For they immediately fall into a second confusion of the same nature in confounding this satisfaction which is the perception, that an event is of a certain general description with an active cause, which is of its nature existent in complete definiteness.
The satisfaction really comes later than the object.
The cause earlier, the satisfaction if a mental perception; not an active cause.
They say that no desire desires anything but it own satisfaction [Repeat].
Now imagine that in your afternoon constitutional you meet a lady who sobbing bitterly and exclaiming "oh how I wish! Oh, I only wish!"
You address her and ask "Madame, will you tell me what it is you wish?"
If she were to reply "I wish that this wish should be gratified and I wish for nothing else".
Well just what is that wish "Why simply that it should be gratified, nothing more" perhaps you might suggest that