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LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 263

however reasonable. They are taught less by theories than by facts and
events. There was much that could be said against making the war an abolition
war — much that seemed wise and patriotic. "Make the war an abolition
war," we were told, "and you drive the border States into the rebellion, and
thus add power to the enemy, and increase the number you will have to meet
on the battle-field. You will exasperate and intensify southern feeling, making
it more desperate, and put far away the day of peace between the two
sections." "Employ the arm of the negro, and the loyal men of the North will
throw down their arms and go home." "This is the white man's country, and
the white man's war." "It would inflict an intolerable wound upon the pride
and spirit of white soldiers of the Union, to see the negro in the United
States uniform. Besides, if you make the negro a soldier, you cannot depend
on his courage: a crack of his old master's whip would send him scampering
in terror from the field." And so it was that custom, pride, prejudice, and the
old-time respect for southern feeling, held back the government from an
anti-slavery policy, and from arming the negro. Meanwhile the rebellion
availed itself of the negro most effectively. He was not only the stomach of
the rebellion, by supplying its commissary department, but he built its forts,
and dug its intrenchments, and performed other duties of its camp, which
left the rebel soldier more free to fight the loyal army than he could otherwise
have been. It was the cotton and corn of the negro that made the rebellion
sack stand on end, and caused a continuance of the war. "Destroy
these," was the burden of all my utterances during this part of the struggle,
"and you cripple and destroy the rebellion." It is surprising how long and
bitterly the government resisted and rejected this view of the situation. The
abolition heart of the North ached over the delay, and uttered its bitter complaints,
but the administration remained blind and dumb. Bull Run, Ball's
Bluff, Big Bethel, Fredericksburg, and the Peninsula disasters were the only
teachers whose authority was of sufficient importance to excite the attention
or respect of our rulers, and they were even slow in being taught by these.
An important point was gained, however, when General B. F. Butler, at
Fortress Monroe, announced the policy of treating the slaves as "contrabands,"
to be made useful to the Union cause, and was sustained therein at
Washington, and sentiments of a similar nature were expressed on the floor
of Congress by Hon. A. G. Riddle of Ohio. A grand accession was made to
this view of the case when Hon. Simon Cameron, then secretary of war,
gave it his earnest support, and General David Hunter put the measure into
practical operation in South Carolina. General Phelps from Vermont, in
command at Carrollton, La., also advocated the same plan though under