20

Logic
IV 20

idiot about the place, could we regard it as an ultimate good that he should thus have all his instincts gratified? I think not. If it would produce a state of content in the poor fellow's mind, and if, for any reason that were a good, then, for the sake of that effect, it is undeniable that the state of things supposed would be good: but that would not make it an ultimate good; on the contrary it would furnish a reason for the sake of which it would be good. These considerations are extremely pertinent to the case we are now to consider, which is that of a person engaged busily in providing for his next day's wants, with just enough uncertainty as to his probably success to keep him industrious. If, for any reason, or without an ultimate reason it is desirable that he should be happy, and if his mental developent is so low that those conditions would make him happy, as possibly they might make some